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The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations
and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic
benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance
on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing
hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for
US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we
find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature
of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs
or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The
evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional
quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power










andrew.waxman@wolfson.ox.ac.ukIn matters of mining taxation, governments rarely believe that companies pay too 
much tax; companies rarely believe that they pay too little tax; and citizens rarely believe 
that they actually see tangible benefits from the taxes that are paid. 
—Otto et al. 2006 
 
At the beginning of the last century, Venezuela, with its rudimentary agricultural 
economy, had the reputation as being one of the most backward nations in the Western 
Hemisphere.  The country was run by Juan Vicente Gómez, put into power in 1908 by a 
U.S.-backed coup d’etat, and the first in a line of caudillo, military-style dictators.  Seven 
years after the coup, the Mene Grande oil field was discovered and in 1917 Venezuela 
began exporting petroleum. The “understanding” that Gómez had with the U.S. oil 
companies and government allowed him to use revenues to equip the first national army, 
expand the bureaucracy, and expand his repressive regime in exchange for cheap oil 
concessions and accommodating legislation (Karl, 1987).   
Yet, from the beginning, the Venezuelan authorities and the oil companies were 
engaged in a “tug-of-war” over the terms of profit-sharing. By the 1950s, Venezuela 
enjoyed greater bargaining power than its Middle Eastern competitors (Mommer 1998).  
In 1958, the government increased the tax rate on oil extraction ten percentage points 
over the U.S. rate shattering its amiable business relationship with the U.S.. This 
precipitated the formation of OPEC in 1960, with Venezuela playing a lead role.  With 
the up-tick in oil prices, the Venezuelans were again able to increase their share of 
economic rents through contract renegotiation. On the tails of OPEC came the 
establishment of the national Venezuelan oil company (Corporación Venezolana de 
   1 Petróleo). By developing  technical ability and expertise in oil extraction, the 
Venezuelans were able to play a bigger role in upstream negotiations and put extra 
leverage on negotiations.
3 In 1973, the Acción Democrática government of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez nationalized the petroleum sector after taking power.  
Chad has not been as successful as Venezuela at protecting the rents associated 
with natural resource extraction. It is a landlocked Saharan country with one of the lowest 
per capita income levels in Africa. It suffers major security problems from incursion on 
its borders with Sudan and Libya and substantial refugee influxes from the Darfur region.  
The country is universally considered a failed state with consistently some of the highest 
levels of corruption in the world. Nevertheless, the World Bank undertook an effort with 
a petroleum consortium in 1995 to begin to take advantage of the country’s oil resources 
in an effort to reduce the drastic levels of poverty in the country.  
Construction began in 2000, with oil flows beginning in 2004.  The revenues 
accruing to the government were set up in such a way as to promote transparency and 
poverty reduction.
4 According to an article in the Guardian newspaper the government’s 
original take was 28% of the total oil value, far smaller than that of other oil-producing 
countries in the region with comparable levels of low governance: Equatorial Guinea, 
Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon.
5  In addition, the consortium of foreign 
petroleum companies seems to have been able to negotiate contracts such that when 
national laws conflicted with any contracts, the contracts would supersede. In an attempt 
                                                 
3 This was later followed by the 1967 Hydrocarbon Law, which also allowed the government to get 
improved concessions (Mommer 1998). 
4 The issue of how and to what extent these petrodollars will promote development of Chad is an 
interesting issue, but one beyond the scope of this paper.  Here we will be concerned with the question of 
how bargaining over economic rents proceeded.   
5 Rice, X. “Fuels to Ourselves.” The Guardian. September 1, 2006. 
   2 to renegotiate its contracts, the government spent $1.6 million on lawyers and consultants 
with the result being a mere 2% increase in the terms of the second contract.
6  
As of late, Chad has not been the only case of extremely generous extraction 
concessions. A recent op-ed piece in the Boston Globe notes that “for a minimal return, 
[The Democratic Republic of the Congo] has signed away millions—if not billions–of 
dollars' worth of copper and cobalt for 35 years.”
 7 Even a leaked World Bank document 
cited in the article admits that "to allow the contracts to proceed without comment would 
put us in the difficult position of perceived complicity and/or tacit approval of them.”
8  
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the terms of profit sharing vary 
widely across countries and over time. Between 1982 and 1999, the share of rents going 
to host country governments in the natural resource extraction industries fell from 52.1% 
to 28.1% (see Tables 1b and 1c). This decline is driven by a reduction in tax collections 
and is consistent with the reforms in the mining sector reported by the World Bank 
(2006). According to the World Bank (2006), competition to attract exploration and 
mining investment has intensified resulting in more generous terms for investors. 
However, we also find that the share of rents paid to developed country governments 
averaged 40.1% while the share of rents paid to developing country governments 
averaged 31.9%. This differential is unlikely to be entirely explained by country risk. 
According to industry analysts, international financial institutions and third-party 
                                                 
6 Katsours, C. “Chad: Growing Oil Revenues, Growing Instability.” Energy Compass. June 10, 2004. 
7 Le Carre, John and Jason Stearns. “Getting Congo’s Wealth to its People.” The Boston Globe. December 
22, 2006. 
8 This is also not to imply that developed countries do not, sometimes, offer consortiums concessions that 
are perceived to be inequitable.  A recent New York Times article explains, “The United States offers some 
of the most lucrative incentives in the world to companies that drill for oil in publicly owned coastal 
waters,” Furthermore, “a newly released study suggests that the government is getting very little for its 
money” (Andrews, E. “Incentives on Oil Barely Help U.S., Study Suggests.” The New York Times. 
December 22, 2006).  
   3 governments lessen the likelihood of expropriation and have significantly reduced the 
importance of country risk.
9 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the cross-country 
variation in the distribution of rents is also likely to be a function of the host country’s 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the multinational corporation.  
To quantify the importance of bargaining strength on rent-sharing, we develop an 
empirical framework based on Nash bargaining. Our economic measures of bargaining 
power include sunk costs, technical expertise of the host country, number of competitors 
and oil prices. We also seek to understand how the quality of governance and the 
development of institutions impact the negotiation process and, in turn, the outcome.  
Conventional wisdom holds that good governance produces desirable economic 
outcomes. For example, numerous studies document the link between the amount of 
foreign direct investment received by a country and the quality of governance 
infrastructure.
10  However, in the case of natural resource extraction, it may be that poor 
governance leads to higher corporate profitability and a smaller share of rents for the host 
country. For this we draw on the large literature on institutions from the past several 
decades using country-level governance measures to assess their impact on economic 
outcomes.  
  We find that the bargaining power of host governments and extraction 
companies does impact the relative distribution of rents. Moreover, our evidence 
indicates  that the higher the quality of institutions and the more democratic a government 
is, the better its deal ends up being. While this may not seem like a highly surprising 
                                                 
9 Boulous, Alfred.  “Assessing Political Risk.” Independent Petroleum Association of America – 
International Primer. 5 
10 Globerman, Steven, and Shapiro, Daniel.  “Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of 
Governance Infrastructure” World Development Volume 30, Issue 11 (2002) 
   4 result, and anecdotal evidence has indicated this for some time, it is—to our 
knowledge—the first econometric attempt to investigate the relationship.  
The importance of political and economic considerations for the outcome of the 
bargaining process is widely recognized but has not been systematically studied in this 
context.
11 Examining profit sharing between producing countries and oil companies in 
the Middle East, Edith Penrose (1959, 1960) notes that “the superior economic power of 
the oil companies arising from their ability to inflict a disastrous economic loss on t
producing country does give them a bargaining position which holds down the share of 
the profits the producing country can obtain in the oil agreement.” However, she argues 
that reducing the monopoly power of oil companies would not likely be welfare 
improving, even for oil-exporting countries, given the increasing returns of the market.  
he 
                                                
More theoretical work has explored the structure and determinants of government 
take—that is the share of economic rent from extraction that goes to the government of 
the country in which the resource is extracted.  The Van Meurs (1981) text on petroleum 
economics lays some theory for defining government take, which is developed further in 
Adelman et al. (1991), who seek to model investment and returns along with risks over 
long-term oil investments.  Newbery’s (1981, 1992) work on industrial organization 
within the petroleum industry was, in part, motivated by a desire to understand the 
dynamics behind cartelization, but also sketched out some ideas for understanding the 
nature of government take within this imperfectly competitive market.   
Shang-Jin Wei has done considerable work looking at the “corruption premium” 
firms pay to do business in countries with poor governance (Wei 2002). Using a matrix of 
 
11 An exception would be Theodore Moran’s 1974 study on bargaining over rents between copper 
companies and the Chilean government. 
   5 FDI data linking 15 source countries to roughly 40 host countries, Wei (2000a) 
demonstrates the taxing effect of corruption on FDI flows (as compared to taxes 
themselves).  The implication of this finding is that corruption will, in a sense, offset 
revenue collection as FDI flows adapt to corruption in much the same way as they would 
to a distortionary tax.  In two follow-up papers, Wei (2000b) (using the same dataset) and 
Smarzynska and Wei (2002) (using firm-level data) demonstrate how corruption changes 
the composition and volume of FDI flows entering countries with poor governance.  This 
research presents a relatively strong case for a negative correlation between government 
take and corruption, but there is no clear focus on what the relationship may be in natural 
resource extracting industries (nor is it evident whether these industries are included in 
the FDI or firm-level data).  Given the more extensive (over time) and intensive nature of 
rent-sharing negotiations in resource extraction, the nature of the trade-off between 
corruption and revenues warrants further investigation. 
  The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes Penrose’s ideas into an 
empirical strategy based on a Nash bargaining framework. Section 3 describes the BEA 
data and our measures of rents and bargaining power. Section 4 provides the cross-
section and time-series evidence. Section 5 discusses some of the limitations of the 
analysis and directions for further research. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. Our 




2.Bargaining Over Rents 
3. 
  We formalize the bargaining process between multinationals and host country 
governments using a Nash bargaining framework. Total rents are given by: 
   6  
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Where Q is the quantity of oil produced, P
oil is the world price of oil and C(Q) is the cost 
of producing a given quantity of oil. In our empirical work, we make the distinction 
between operating costs and sunk costs which consist primarily of research and 
development expenditures. Let the outside options for multinationals and host country 




MNC. The outside options for multinationals are 
defined by opportunities in other countries while the outside options for the government 
is what the government can earn if it operates the company itself. The bargaining 
strengths of the two parties are denoted by α and (1-α) for the government and the 
multinational respectively. While the two parties’ respective bargaining strengths are 
partially determined by outside options, they may also be influenced by institutional 
factors not specific to the particular project at hand. For example, Penrose talks about the 
importance of popular opinion in shaping a government’s ultimate bargaining position.  
 
  The outcome of this bargaining process is determined as the solution to 
maximizing—over πG and πMNC—the following: 
 
] ) ( ) [(
1 * * α α π π π π
− − − MNC MNC G G x  s.t.   π π π = + MNC G    (2) 
 
This yields the following solution for government rents: 
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which,  for the purposes of the empirical work, we rewrite in the following way: 
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   7 Three factors influence the share of rents going to the host country: (i) the relative 
bargaining strength of the government α , (ii) the outside options available to the 
government π
*
G  and (iii) the outside options available to the multinational π
*
MNC .  
 
  Our empirical investigation is guided by the solution to the bargaining game. In 
particular, we estimate the following equation: 
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The dependent variable is the share of rents going to the government and is sometimes 
referred to as the “government take”. We are able to measure this variable directly as the 
ratio of taxes, royalties and government profits over total profits generated by the project. 
β1 measures the impact of the government’s bargaining strength relative to the 
multinational on the share of rents going to the government and we expect it to be 
positive. β2 measures the impact of the multinational’s outside options and its expected 
sign is negative. And β3 measures the impact of the government’s outside options on the 
share of rents going to the government and its expected sign is positive.  
  We turn now to a description of the data and our proxies for bargaining power 
and outside options. 
 
3.  The BEA Data 
  We analyze the firm-level surveys on US direct investment abroad, collected each 
year by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The BEA requires that US-based multinationals disclose (confidentially) balance sheet-
type data about their overseas activities annually.  Here a US-based multinational is 
defined as the combination of a single US entity that has made the direct investment, 
called the parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate. 
We use the data collected on majority-owned, non-bank foreign affiliates and non-bank 
US parents for the benchmark years between 1982 and 1999.  The benchmark years are 
   8 1982, 1989, 1994 and 1999 and include more comprehensive information than the annual 
surveys.  
While our choice of benchmark years has been dependent on the availability of 
BEA’s survey data, it seems important to note that the beginning of our panel data series 
follows five years after the enactment of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
which requires any company that has publicly traded stock to “maintain records that 
accurately and fairly represent its transactions,” and which make it “unlawful for a U.S. 
person to make payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining 
business for or with any person” (US Department of Justice website).  In effect, our data 
is, therefore, coming from the era of FCPA enactment and may reflect less corruption 
than a sample taken from the period before (or shortly after) 1977.   
Creating a panel using the benchmark years of the BEA survey data requires a 
number of adjustments. First, not all firms are required to report to the BEA and reporting 
requirements vary across years. Second, because we are interested in understanding what 
is happening at the industry level, we must consider the implications of the changes to the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in 1972 and 1987 and the switch from SIC 
codes to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes in 1999. 
And finally, the fact that parents are allowed to consolidate information for several 
affiliates in one country on a single form calls for special care in the aggregation and 
interpretation of affiliate level data. 
All foreign affiliates with sales, assets or net income in excess of a certain amount 
in absolute value must report to the BEA. This amount was $3 million dollars in 1982, 
1989 and 1994 and jumped to $7 million dollars in 1999. In addition, a new reporting 
   9 requirement was imposed on parents in 1999. Parents whose sales, assets or net income 
exceeded $100 million (in absolute value) were required to provide more extensive 
information than parents whose sales, assets or net income fell below $100 million. To 
determine whether the changes in reporting requirements biased our sample toward small 
firms in the early years, we imposed a double filter on the data using the uniform cutoff 
for affiliates (based on the strictest reporting requirement of $100 million in 1999) of 
$5.59 million in 1982 US dollars and $79.87 1982 US dollars for parents. As it turns out, 
the reporting requirements were large enough that imposing the filter on the data makes 
little difference. 
Finally, to focus our analysis in on the subset of resource extracting, foreign 
affiliates, our sample only includes affiliates classified prior to 1999 as Mining or Oil and 
Gas Extraction (SIC87 codes 10-14) and for 1999 as Oil and Gas Extraction (NAICS97 
code 211) and Mining (NAICS97 code 212).  
Key Variables: 
Government Share of Rents 
  We define this variable as the sum of all direct payments to the government as a 
result of the project divided by income net of operating costs. In practice, government 
take on extraction projects can take a number of different forms.  Very generally, the 
systems can be divided into royalty payment, taxation, and profit sharing.   Any given 
investment may be subject to one or more of these transfers as stipulated by contract, and 
the government’s revenue profile and share of risk will certainly depend on what type(s) 
of system(s) is in place.   
   10 For our purposes, we define payments to the government as including taxes 
(income and other), royalty payments and profits earned by the government as a result of 
profit sharing agreements. The dataset does not make a clear distinction between 
payments to the national government (versus regional or local governments), but given 
the national importance that most oil investments have, in addition to the scale of 
revenues coming out, it seems reasonable to assume that they accrue to the national 
government.  Our measurement of profit sharing is an admittedly imperfect one, but 
profit-sharing is often a major share of government take in extraction contracts, so it is 
important to include even an imperfect control. The BEA’s survey of US Direct 
Investment Abroad provides information on what share of a foreign affiliate’s equity is 
held by a foreign owner.  Assuming that this foreign owner is, at least in most instances, 
the host country’s government, we then multiply this percentage by the affiliate’s net 
income to get a rough estimate of profits accruing to the host country. 
Table 1 reports the trends in the government share of rents across regions and 
over time. We also report separately the share of rents earned from taxes, royalty 
payments and profit sharing. A number of things stand out: for all regions, and as a 
whole, the share of total rents going to the host country has decreased over 1982-1999.    
The decline has been most dramatic in Europe/Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
stylistic fact poses an intriguing entry point for our discussion: why did government take 
fall so dramatically over 1982-1999 in two of the world’s most politically tumultuous 
regions? Also, why in 1999 was government take in developed countries almost twice 
that in Sub-Saharan Africa? Finally, looking at the breakdown of different types of 
transfers, we can see that taxes comprise the largest chunk of government take, but that 
   11 the relative size of profit-sharing and royalty payments compared to taxes varies from 
region to region.   
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Bargaining Power 
  The bargaining power of the government is affected by a host of country-specific 
institutional factors. A government’s accountability to its people is likely to influence its 
bargaining power. In a country where the outcome of negotiations are more transparent, 
the government will feel more pressure to push for a better deal. In an extreme case, the 
government’s threat point is determined by the possibility of civil unrest and plant 
closure. Thus, the country must balance the revenue it stands to lose if it takes too tough a 
stance with the possibility of political upheaval. We measure the level of accountability 
to the people using democracy, and voice and accountability. Political risk increases the 
likelihood of disruption of a project, increasing risk and decreasing the government’s 
bargaining power. Thus it may not be surprising that firms require a higher share of a 
project’s total benefits in developing countries, where political risks are greater. We 
measure political risk using the ICRG composite index since it is the only measure 
available that dates back to 1982.  
  As noted by Penrose, the government’s accountability to its people is also likely 
to affect its bargaining stance. In country’s where citizens can more readily learn the 
terms of a particular contract it will be more difficult for governments to strike deals that 
are especially favorable to multinationals. Our measure of government accountability to 
the people is democracy taken from Freedom House. Freedom House publishes 
information on civil liberties and political rights separately. Since these two variables are 
highly correlated, we follow Helliwell [1994] and combine the two ratings into a single 
index that varies from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating greater democracy. Civlib and 
prights vary between 1 and 7 -  we transform these to a variable that ranges between 0 
and 1 (with higher values indicating greater democracy) using the transformation [14-
   12 civlib-prights]/12. This variable is available since 1970. As a robustness check, we also 
use the sub-component of the ICRG index democratic accountability.  
  We also expect the level of corruption to influence the outcome of the bargain – 
in more corrupt environments, multinationals may be able to strike a better deal. We 
measure this using the ICRG’s corruption. And finally, the government’s bargaining 
power is directly a function of the technical expertise of its bureaucrats. We measure this 
using the ICRG’s bureaucratic quality.  
  We measure the bargaining power of the multinational vis-à-vis the host 
government in two ways. We assume that the amount of competition from other similar 
firms in that same market reduces a given multinationals bargaining power. If there are 
more firms in the consortium, the host government may be more able to bid up its own 
take, despite any collusion that may occur. Therefore, we measure the bargaining power 
of the multinational as n, the number of US multinationals in the market in a given 
country and year. An increase in n weakens the bargaining power of any given 
multinational in the country. Following Vernon’s (1971) obsolescing bargaining model, 
we also include as a measure of the multinational’s bargaining power, the ratio of sunk to 
total costs of production. The greater share of sunk costs a firm has paid the more it is 
“stuck” with its investment, the more costly expropriation would be, and the more likely 
it is to concede to terms that are less profitable for itself.  We define sunk costs as the 
firm’s expenditure on exploration and development—namely how much it has spent in a 
country’s oil fields to find oil plus the cost of investment in property plant and equipment 
and normalize this variable by total costs of production to obtain the ratio of sunk to total 
costs..  Both an increased share of sunk costs and a greater n are associated with lower 
bargaining power for US MNCs. 
 
Outside Options 
  The host country’s alternative to agreeing to a deal with the consortium of 
extraction firms are largely determined by the government’s capacity to run the oil 
company without the multinational. This in turn is a function of the technical knowledge 
of its labor force. We proxy for this aspect of bargaining power by using the share of 
employees working in the foreign affiliate that are local citizens.  We justify the proxy 
   13 with the following logic: The ultimate threat point for a national government in 
negotiations with a consortium of extraction firms is nationalization—seizure of the 
means of production, and therefore the entire investment.  In so doing, the country must 
balance the increased revenues it gains from complete ownership (of production and 
assets) with the decrease in revenues from being a less efficient operator of the extraction 
process than the private companies.  In extremely underdeveloped countries, it may be 
the case that almost all of the skilled employees of the operation are foreign, in which 
case, the national government will not be able to run the operation at all, and therefore it 
has a relatively low threat point and limited outside options.
12   
  For the multinational, the alternative to investing in a particular country are what 
the firm could make if it shut down operations and relocated to another country. The 
costs associated with doing this are – to some extent – already captured in the ratio of 
sunk to total costs of production. The potential benefits of relocating to another country 
are the profits the multinational could make in another country relative to the profits it 
stands to make if it stays put. To measure this, we first compute the firms profit margin as 
the ratio of net income to costs of production. The profit margin is then normalized by the 
average profit margin across all firms operating in the same sector in a given year by 
subtracting from the firm’s profit margin the industry average. Increases in this variable 
can be interpreted as lowering the multinationals threat point in a bargaining situation. 
 
The Price of Oil 
We include as a regressor the real price of crude oil. This is meant to capture the 
fact that tax and royalty payments are often tied to prices. For example, following the 
first oil shock in the 1970s, the government of Alberta, Canada refined its royalty formula 
to make it sensitive to price changes (Alberta Royalty Review, 2007 – Royalty 
Information Series
13). This type of provision is also common in the mining industry 
(Otto, J. et al, 2006). For the sake of completeness, we should also include in our 
regressions the prices of all other minerals. With the exception of oil, data limitations 
                                                 
12 Granted not all of the foreign, skilled employees running the operations of a US multinational abroad 
may be US citizens—they could be skilled citizens of other nations—but we believe this, nonetheless, to be 
a reasonable estimate. 
13 Source: http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/aboutus/pdfs/InfoSeries-Report3-Formulas.pdf. 
   14 make it impossible for us to know exactly which mineral is being extracted by the firms 
in our sample. However, to the extent that oil prices are demand driven, movements in 
the price of oil will capture movements in other minerals prices. 
 
4. Results 
  Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis.  As 
discussed earlier, the first four variables are measures of government take, and thus vary 
between 0 and 1.  The standard deviations for all four of these variables are comparably 
large (especially royalties and profits, which, on average, make up a small amount of 
total government take).  This provides us with a great deal of variation in our dependent 
variable (i.e., noise), which is less than desirable.  We also previously described the ratio 
of sunk to total costs and competition, which are proxies for MNC bargaining power, and 
the government’s ability to run the business (i.e., the inverse of the share of U.S. citizens 
employed), which is a proxy for the host government’s bargaining power.  Non-
operational takes a value of one if the plant was strictly in the exploration stage and so 
not extracting material:  6.5% of the observations are classified as non-operational.  
 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Fixed Effects Regressions 
  We estimate equation (3) using a fixed effects regression to remove time-
invariant, firm-specific characteristics that would bias our estimation of the role of our 
institutional variables on government take.  This decreases the variation in our 
institutional variables considerably, but does not appear to dramatically change our 
results relative to the OLS regressions we have run. Regression (1) shows us that an 
increase in the ratio of sunk to total costs results in an increase in government take of 
0.056.  The other limitation to oil company bargaining power, competition, results in a 
0.019 increase in government take. A .01 increase in the share of nationals employed by 
the multinational, that is government ability to run the business, results in a .001 increase 
in the government take.  A one dollar increase in crude oil prices results in an increase of 
   15 government take of 0.6 confirming the prevalence of contracts that tie host country 
benefits to prices. An increase in the profit margin of a project relative to projects in other 
countries increases government take by 0.278. We interpret this as evidence that the 
multinational is more willing to concede to generous terms when a project is 
exceptionally profitable. Finally, an affiliate that is non-operational decreases 
government take by 0.096.  This latter result is consistent with the fact that firms do not 
pay taxes until they are operational. All of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 
1% level and the regression R squared is 0.23 and indication that our regressors have 
significant explanatory power. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
  When we add political risk to the regression, the coefficient is 0.014 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Since political risk varies from 0 to 6 with 6 
being the least risky, this result implies that government take varies one for one with 
political risk. The ICRG measures of institutional quality (Democratic Accountability, 
Bureaucratic Quality, and Level of Corruption) all have roughly half the same positive 
effect on government take and are all statistically significant at the 1% level.   When 
these institutional variables are added, the coefficients and standard errors on the other 
regressors are largely unaffected. The coefficient on democracy is positive but 
statistically insignificant so that – at least as measured – there does not appear to be a 
strong association between political rights, civil liberties and government take. The fact 
that democratic accountability and democracy yield different results suggests that the two 
variables are measuring different things. Indeed, democratic accountability as measured 
by ICRG appears to capture political stability rather than accountability to the people.  
per se.  
  Turning to Table 4, which uses government take from taxes as the dependent 
variable, we see that the results are largely the same as with total benefits, but with 
slightly different magnitudes.  Government ability doubles in magnitude compared to the 
previous regressions while the magnitudes on the multinationals relative profitability falls 
by a third. One explanation for these changes is that government ability is known ahead 
   16 of time and so impacts the overall tax deal a firm gets while the firms profitability 
relative to other projects only becomes known over time. Thus, some of the concessions 
associated with relative profitability may be more closely tied to royalties and/or profit-
sharing. The magnitudes and significance of the institutional variables are largely 
unchanged with the exception of democracy which is now positive and significant at the 
5% level. This may be because tax rates are typically public knowledge while royalties 
and profit sharing agreements tend to be private knowledge. The results in Table 5 
support this hypothesis - democracy is not a significant predictor of host country share of 
benefits from profits.  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
  When we look at the results for government take from profit sharing regressed 
on our set of explanatory variables, the coefficients are generally of smaller magnitude 
and less statistically significant.  The impact of share of sunk costs on government take is 
much smaller at 0.016, and only marginally significant.  Competition, MNCs relative 
profits, the non-operational dummy, and all of our institutional variables are also never 
statistically significant. Government ability remains statistically significant but only at 
the 5% level and with a miniscule coefficient. The sign on the price of oil changes 
indicating that a one dollar increase in the price of oil reduces the host country share of 
benefits from profits by 0.10. Since taxes and royalties tend to rise with oil prices, this 
result implies that profit sharing agreements have become less favorable to host countries 
as oil prices have increased. However, the R-squared for these regressions are far smaller 
than for those in Tables 3 and 4. The relatively small share of government take from 
profits and the smaller variance that we observed in the summary statistics may result in 
their being dramatically less “signal” for all the “noise” in our data, and may disguise any 
actual significant results.  Moreover, it seems a bit ill-advised to conclude from these 
results that these standard explanations do not affect profit sharing behavior. This 
relationship requires further exploration beyond the model presented here. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
   17 5. Discussion & Conclusion 
  The basic multivariate regressions presented here demonstrate preliminary 
evidence that the bargaining power of host governments and extraction companies can 
impact the relative distribution of rents. Moreover, our results suggests that the higher the 
quality of institutions and the more democratic a government is, the better its deal ends 
up being. While this may not seem like a highly surprising result, and anecdotal evidence 
has indicated this for sometime, it is—to our knowledge—the first econometric attempt 
to investigate the relationship.  The implication of our findings is that – on average – poor 
countries keep a smaller share of the rents from natural resource extraction than rich 
countries. Although the World Bank has been extensively involved in some of these 
negotiations, the cases of Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo suggest that it 
has not been very effective at protecting host country rents.  In addition, this paper 
provides systematic empirical evidence in support of Vernon’s classic theory of the 
obsolescing bargain. As the ratio of sunk to total costs increase, the multinational’s share 
of rents declines. 
  Whether the relationship between governance and government take we have 
uncovered is attributable to better governance meaning lower political risk (and thus a 
smaller demanded risk premium for firms), or whether this is a result of more capable 
governments being able (or willing) to negotiate better deals for their citizens, is unclear 
and warrants further investigation. We know from Wei (2000) and others that risk 
matters, but could bargaining power matter as much too? 
  In addition, any correlation between countries that have nationalized a resource 
extraction industry and the country’s level of governance could bias our estimates. A 
more thorough investigation of nationalized industries and country governance would be 
useful for further understanding the relationship between bargaining power and rent-
sharing.  In particular, a more thorough inquiry into the nature and variation of rent 
sharing methods (taxes, production sharing, profit sharing, and royalties) and the 
distinction between costs of doing business related to rent sharing versus those related to 
corruption would advance this field of research substantially.  While the relation between 
rates of return and governance has been better understood in manufacturing industries 
and in aggregate, the more complicated relationship that occurs in the resource extraction 
   18 industries certainly warrants as much, if not more understanding, if only because of its 
profound effect on how the natural wealth of nations is utilized. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Means of Key Variables by Region  
        
Table 1a: Means Over All Years          
        
 




Share of Total 
Benefits Taxes Royalties Profits 
Developed 
Economies 0.409 0.258 0.070 0.033 
EAP 0.335 0.212 0.059 0.036 
ECA 0.173 0.091 0.011 0.069 
LAC 0.382 0.252 0.023 0.058 
MENA 0.349 0.236 0.053 0.029 
SSA 0.354 0.229 0.062 0.038 
Total 0.378 0.242 0.056 0.039 
        
Table 1b: Means in 1982          
 




Share of Total 
Benefits  Taxes Royalties Profits 
Developed 
Economies 0.528 0.394 0.066 0.041 
EAP 0.481 0.376 0.053 0.038 
ECA 0.442 0.441 0.001 0.000 
LAC 0.494 0.415 0.013 0.063 
MENA 0.502 0.367 0.047 0.043 
SSA 0.590 0.395 0.087 0.086 
Total 0.521 0.394 0.056 0.049 
        
Table 1c: Means in 1999          
 




Share of Total 
Benefits  Taxes Royalties Profits 
Developed 
Economies 0.333 0.202 0.064 0.028 
EAP 0.316 0.196 0.057 0.046 
ECA 0.100 0.062 0.011 0.037 
LAC 0.270 0.154 0.036 0.068 
MENA 0.264 0.187 0.034 0.039 
SSA 0.162 0.090 0.068 0.009 
Total 0.281 0.169 0.052 0.039 
Note: South Asia is included in the totals but not separately since it wasn’t part of the 







Table 2: Summary Statistics 
    
Variable Name  Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
     Host Country Stare of 
Benefits  2046 0.378 0.278 
     Host Country Share of 
Benefits from Taxes  2046 0.242 0.219 
     Host Country Share of 
Benefits from Royalties  2046 0.056 0.181 
     Host Country Share of 
Benefits from Profits  2046 0.039 0.123 
     Ratio of Sunk to Total 
Costs 2046 0.564 0.367 
Competition 2046 41.87 51.62 
     Government's Ability to 
Run Business  2046 0.075 0.176 
     Price of Oil ($/barrel, real 
2006 US$)  2046 24.65 12.30 
MNCs Relativ Profitability  2046 0.017 0.460 
Non- Operational  2046 0.065 0.246 
Democracy 2046 0.607 0.385 
Political Risk  2046 4.938 2.216 
Democratic Accountability  2046 3.712 2.037 
Bureaucratic Quality  2046 2.358 1.457 

















TABLE 3: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS HOST COUNTRY SHARE OF TOTAL BENEFITS 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Sunk/Total  Costs  0.056 0.057 0.058  0.057 0.057 
  (2.90)** (2.91)** (2.97)**  (2.93)** (2.93)** 
Competition  0.019 0.017 0.023  0.018 0.019 
  (3.03)** (2.44)*  (3.56)**  (2.82)** (2.93)** 
Govt.  Ability 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (3.44)** (3.77)** (3.36)**  (3.63)** (3.50)** 
MNCs  Rel.  Profits  0.278 0.271 0.279  0.276 0.277 
 (18.50)** (17.75)** (18.59)**  (18.15)**  (18.34)**
Real  Oil  Price  0.006 0.006 0.006  0.006 0.006 
  (8.88)** (8.72)** (8.95)**  (8.69)** (8.90)** 
Non-Operational  -0.096 -0.085 -0.095  -0.090 -0.093 
  (3.31)** (2.95)** (3.28)**  (3.12)** (3.21)** 
Political Risk   0.014         
  (4.19)**       
Democracy     0.010      
   (0.48)      
Dem.  Account.      0.017    
    (4.67)**    
Bureaucratic  Q.        0.011   
      (2.20)*   
Corruption         0.012 
       (3.23)** 
Observations 2042 2042 2042  2042 2042 
Number of 
parent_id 
289 289 289  289 289 
R-squared  0.23 0.23 0.24  0.23 0.23 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 














TABLE 4: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS HOST COUNTRY SHARE OF BENEFITS FROM TAXES 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Sunk/Total Costs   0.055   0.056   0.056   0.056   0.055 
  (3.05)** (3.11)** (3.10)**  (3.08)** (3.07)** 
Competition  0.014 0.008 0.016  0.013 0.013 
  (2.42)* (1.26)  (2.67)**  (2.23)* (2.22)* 
Govt.  Ability  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
  (5.37)** (5.86)** (5.39)**  (5.54)** (5.48)** 
MNCs  Rel.  Profits  0.196 0.184 0.195  0.193 0.193 
 (14.06)** (13.05)** (13.97)**  (13.76)**  (13.82)** 
Real  Oil  Price 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.005 0.005 
  (8.13)** (7.94)** (8.14)**  (7.96)** (8.11)** 
Non-Operational -0.067 -0.057 -0.065  -0.063 -0.064 
  (2.51)* (2.13)* (2.41)*  (2.34)* (2.37)* 
Political Risk   0.012         
  (3.93)**       
Democracy  0.027      
   (1.99)*      
Dem.  Account.      0.012    
    (3.38)**    
Bureaucratic  Q.        0.010   
      (2.07)*   
Corruption         0.008 
       (2.38)* 
Observations  2042 2042 2042  2042 2042 
Number of 
parent_id 
289 289 289  289 289 
R-squared  0.18 0.17 0.18  0.18 0.18 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 













TABLE 5: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS HOST COUNTRY SHARE OF BENEFITS FROM PROFITS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Sunk/Total  Costs  0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016  0.016 
 (1.95)  (1.99)*  (1.94)  (1.95)  (1.95) 
Competition  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003  -0.003 
  (1.16) (0.53) (0.87) (1.19)  (1.09) 
Govt. Ability   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
  (2.25)* (2.43)* (2.36)* (2.24)*  (2.29)* 
MNCs Rel. Profits  0.005  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.005 
  (0.80) (1.14) (0.95) (0.76)  (0.86) 
Real Oil Price  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (2.10)* (2.05)* (2.05)* (2.09)*  (2.08)* 
Non-Operational  -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014  -0.014 
  (1.16) (1.22) (1.24) (1.14)  (1.19) 
Political  Risk  0.000       
  (0.22)       
Democracy   -0.013       
   (1.58)       
Dem. Account.      -0.001     
     (0.90)     
Bureaucratic  Q.     0.001   
     (0.38)   
Corruption       -0.000 
       (0.19) 
Observations  2042 2042 2042 2042  2042 
Number of parent_id  289  289  289  289  289 
R-squared  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05  0.06 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 














Appendix Table A.1 : World Bank Country Classifications 
Country Name  World Bank 
Classification 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Dem. Rep. Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom 
High Income: OECD 
Aruba, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Cyprus, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Kuwait, 




Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Panama, 
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, RB 
Upper Middle Income 
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, 
Guyana ,Honduras, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Morocco, 
Namibia, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian 
Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey 
Lower Middle Income 
Dem. Rep. Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Haiti, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistán, Vietnam, Rep. Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Low Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 